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I. THE TORT REFORM PROCESS
In 1979, the Interagency Task Force published the Model Uniform Product
Liability Act (UPLA). 1 Since then, the course taken by the proponents of products
liability reform has been almost exclusively a federal one,2 notwithstanding the
model law approach of UPLA. 3 Nevertheless, failure of the federal initiatives in
1986 coupled with the Democratic takeover of the Senate and the Chairmanship
of the Senate Commerce Committee shifted the momentum for reform to the
states.
4
In May, 1985, Senate Bill No. 126, which provided for various reforms of
medical malpractice law and procedure, failed before the Missouri legislature. As
a direct result, a Senate Interim Committee was established under the chairman-
ship of Senator J. Mathewson. The committee, which conducted hearings around
the state during the fall of 1985, was charged with examining the malpractice
and products liability insurance "crises." The Interim Committee's work and the
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1. Reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714-50 (1979).
2. See, e.g., S. 44, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984) (Kasten); S. 100, 99th Cong., Ist Sess. (1986)
(Kasten); S. 2760, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (Commerce Committee reported bill); S. 1999, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1986) (Danforth, as amended); H.R. 2729, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983) (Shumway
& Mikulski).
3. UPLA was drafted for "voluntary use by the states." 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
4. 15 PROD. SAFETY & LrAB. REP. (BNA) 51 (1987). However, the tide of federal proposals
has not been turned fully. See, e.g., S. 687, 688, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Danforth); S. 666,
100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Kasten with amendments); H.R. 635, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)
(Dannemeyer); H.R. 1115, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (Richardson & Luken); H.R. 1599, 100th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) (McKinney). Furthermore, most of the insurance and commerce lobbying
campaigns were nationally driven, fuelled by reports of increasing liability insurance rates.
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legislative compromise between provider groups and the plaintiff's bar' concen-
trated almost exclusively on medical malpractice. 6 However, subsequent Senate
interest in products liability reform and House interest in punitive damages
guaranteed that the next legislative session would see the introduction of major
tort reform legislation.
In August, 1986, a task force7 under the chairmanship of John C. Shepherd
was appointed by Governor John Ashcroft and the legislature.' Its stated purpose
was to investigate and recommend changes to the state's liability and insurance
systems. 9 Its apparent purpose was to produce a compromise agreement between
the Missouri Association of Trial Attorneys (MATA-the plaintiff's bar) and a
group representing defense interests called Missourians for Civil Justice Reform.'0
Because the task force was established to produce acceptable pro-defense "crisis"
legislation, it is worthy of note that in its final report the task force seemed
uncertain whether there was any real crisis at all." The task force held public
hearings between August and October, 1986 and then concentrated on producing
a legislative compromise. Agreement almost eluded the task force when MATA
refused to countenance the proposed reform of joint and several liability. 2
However, at its final meeting on January 5, 1987, the parties agreed to minor
modifications of the joint and several liability rule that eventually were enacted.'
On the basis of the task force report,14 House Bill 7005' was drafted and
introduced before the General Assembly on February 9, 1987. After passage
through the House, 6 the bill was approved by the Senate Budget Control
Committee' 7 and introduced in the Senate,'" notwithstanding criticism by Ralph
Nader.' 9 When the bill came up before the Senate on its third reading, an
5. See Mo. Rav. STAT. §§ 538.205-538.235 (1986).
6. See generally Terry, Missouri's Malpractice Concord, 51 Mo. L. REv. 457 (1986).
7. Officially known as The Missouri Task Force on Liability Insurance. See Final Report of
the Missouri Task Force on Liability Insurance (Jan. 6, 1987), Mo. SENATE J., March 4, 1987, at
357 [hereinafter cited as Final Report].
8. Senate President John Scott and House Speaker Bob Griffin. Originally, the Senate had
intended to act independently with a Select Committee. However, the House indicated that it would
counter with its own proposals and the Governor was considering his own initiative. Therefore, the
parties agreed to a single task force, with each of the three moving parties appointing five members.
9. Final Report, supra note 7, at 358-59, 361-65.
10. See generally St. Louis Bus. Journal, Jan. 5-11, 1987 at 6, col. 1.
11. Final Report, supra note 7, at 358-59, 361-65.
12. St. Louis Bus. Journal, Jan. 5-11, 1987 at 7, col. 2.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 202-11.
14. The Task Force's report was entered into the Senate Record. Thus, House Bill possesses a
legislative history which will be of considerable importance in its interpretation. See Final Report,
supra note 7, at 357.
15. 84th Gen. Ass., 1st Reg. Sess. (1987) [hereinafter referred to as H.B. 700].
16. February 19, 1987.
17. Mo. SENATE J., Feb. 26, 1987, at 321.
18. Id. at 324.
19. Causing the News Tribune of Jefferson City to state in an editorial, "[ais Missouri pulls
itself out of the liability quicksand, our lawmakers need to be wary of big-name activists who would
cut off the only path to safety."
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amendment was offered and passed2° deleting the section limiting awards of
punitive damages against newspapers.2 That amendment had been defeated in
the House. 22 Thus the fragile consensus surrounding the passage of the bill was
threatened. At this time the only other provision threatening the bill's passage
was the section permitting credit from previous punitive damage awards. 2 That,
too, was removed from the bill, 24 prior to its unanimous passage by the Senate
on March 9, 1987.25 A conference committee agreed to the deletion of the libel
provision and compromised on the punitive damage credit provision. 26 House and
Senate approval followed. 27 On April 14, 1987, Governor Ashcroft signed the
bill into law.2"
House Bill 700 focuses on three issues: regulation of certain aspects of
property and casualty insurance including capitalization requirements, limitations
on cancellation, rate regulation and claims reporting; tort reform specific to
products liability cases; and, reform of general applicability to tort law, other
than in medical malpractice cases. This article seeks to provide a contextual
analysis of the changes wrought to the products liability and tort systems.
II. MISSOURI PRODUCTS LAW-SOME NECESSARY BACKGROUND
In 1969, the Missouri Supreme Court in Keener v. Dayton Electric Manu-
facturing Co. ,29 introduced strict tort liability to supplement the implied warranty
doctrine30 and moved Missouri products law into the mainstream. Keener placed
Missouri in alignment with the majority of jurisdictions in adopting the formu-
lation of liability found in the Second Restatement of Torts, Section 402A.11
20. Mo. SENATE J., March 2, 1987, at 343-44.
21. This section, the original section 44 in the bill, would have placed a variable cap on such
awards based upon the circulation of the newspaper.
22. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, March 3, 1987, at 12C, col. 3.
23. This was the subject of proposed Senate Amendment No. 4 which would have deleted what
was passed finally in modified form as § 39.4.
24. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 5, 1987, at 4A, col. 4.
25. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Mar. 10, 1987, at 6A, col. 2.
26. By clarifying the grounds upon which the trial judge could refuse to grant the credit. See
infra text accompanying notes 170-78.
27. See generally The Columbia Missourian, Apr. 1, 1987, at IA, col. 1; St. Louis Post-
Dispatch, Apr. 1, 1987, at 6A, col. 1.
28. St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Apr. 15, 1987, at 5A, col. 5. H.B. 700, as enacted, contained an
emergency clause applying the provisions of the new legislation to any cause of action accruing after
July 1, 1987. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § C.
29. 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
30. Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., 372 S.W.2d 41 (Mo. 1963) (en banc).
31. (1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user
or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby caused to the ultimate
user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial change in
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Missouri courts have continued to apply that basic principle of strict liability
whether a plaintiff is alleging a manufacturing (quality control) defect,3 2 a design
defect,33 or a marketing (warning) defect.3 4 Whatever the allegation, plaintiff's
burden includes showing that the product's use was a reasonably foreseeable
use."
As with the current Missouri verdict director,6 House Bill 700 confusingly
treats manufacturing and design defects 37 as a single allegation distinct from the
marketing defect (failure to warn).38 However, House Bill 700 breaks new ground
for Missouri law in that section 33 introduces a new statutory definition of a
"Products Liability Claim." ' 39 At first this provision appears to do little more
the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not brought the product from or entered into any contractual
relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
32. Keener v. Dayton Elec. Mfg., Co., 445 S.W.2d 362 (Mo. 1969).
33. Blevins v. Cushman Motors, 551 S.W.2d 602 (Mo. 1977); Duke v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co.,
660 S.W.2d 404, 411-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
34. Elmore v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 673 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).
35. See, e.g., Klein v. General Elec. Co., 714 S.W.2d 896, 900 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986). Compare
H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 33(2), which uses the phrase "reasonably anticipated" use. See Mo.
APPROV. JuRy INsTR. 25.04 (3d ed. 1981 and Supp. 1987) [hereinafter MAI]. For the co-existence of
reasonable foresight as part of plaintiff's case with the new comparative fault affirmative defense of
product misuse, see infra text accompanying notes 139-49.
36. MAI § 25.04 provides:
Strict Liability - Product Defect
Your verdict must be for plaintiff if you believe:
First, the defendant sold the (describe product) in the course of defendant's business, and
Second, the (describe product) was then in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
when put to a reasonably anticipated use, and
Third, the (describe product) was used in a manner reasonably anticipated, and
Fourth, plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such defective condition as existed when
the (describe product) was sold.
37. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 33(3)(a).
38. Id. at § 33(3)(b).
39. [A] claim or portion of a claim in which the plaintiff seeks relief in the form of damages
on a theory that the defendant is strictly liable for such damages because:
(1) The defendant, wherever situated in the chain of commerce, transferred a product in
the course of his business; and
(2) The product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated; and
(3) Either or both of the following:
(a) The product was then in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous when put to
a reasonably anticipated use, and the plaintiff was damaged as a direct result of such
defective condition as existed when the product was sold; or
(b) The product was then unreasonably dangerous when put to a reasonably anticipated
use without knowledge of its characteristics, and the plaintiff was damaged as a direct
result of the product being sold without an adequate warning.
Id. at § 33.
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than confirm Missouri's current doctrinal statement of the elements of a plaintiff's
case. A philosophical attack might be levelled against any such unnecessary
codification of an evolving area of the common law. However, such a consid-
eration is dwarfed by a more profound technical question concerning the appli-
cability of House Bill 700 to contractual implied warranty claims.
Products liability practitioners acknowledge that, today, there are few im-
portant substantive distinctions between warranty and strict tort theories of
products liability. It is arguable that section 33 does not address this contractual
variant on products liability law. Judicial endorsement of this view would lead
to wholesale circumvention of House Bill 700's provisions regarding mere sellers,
state of the art evidence, and comparative fault. Unfortunately, the language of
section 33, dependent as it is on the language of current Missouri products law,
would be difficult to interpret as referring to anything other than the strict tort
action.40
Let us presume, however, that contrary to the terminology of House Bill
700, the Missouri Supreme Court was to interpret section 33 as also applying to
implied warranty claims. Such an interpretation would have the effect of applying
comparative fault principles41 to warranty claims that are really "loss of bargain"
cases.4 2 That would involve a radical departure from the current state of Missouri
law, 43 a departure not envisaged by the Task Force.
These problems could be avoided and the legislative intent given effect with
the following interpretation. Rather than pose the question "What do we under-
stand by a 'products liability claim'?" in the hope of determining whether that
includes a warranty claim, a preferable approach is to pose the question, "What
do we mean by a 'breach of warranty claim'?"
Contemporary implied warranty doctrine contemplates two distinct actions:
first, "a remedy for a bad bargain, a matter more like contract;"" second,
"consequential damages resulting from a bad product, a matter more like tort. 4 5
It is suggested that this approach should be adopted by the Missouri Supreme
Court in interpreting House Bill 700, section 33 and, in determining the appli-
cability of the substantive provisions of the new statute. In accordance with
current Missouri views on the appropriateness of certain redistributive mechan-
40. One radical approach would be to interpret section 33 as initiating a new statutory products
cause of action distinct from strict liability, negligence or warranty. See McIlwain v. Moser Farms
Dairy, Inc., 40 Conn. Supp. 230, 488 A.2d 102 (1985).
41. Because H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 33 controls the applicability of section 36.2.
42. See generally East River S.S. Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
See also Solimine, Recovery of Economic Damages in Products Liability Actions and the Reemer-
gence of Contractual Remedies, 51 Mo. L. REv. 977 (1987).
43. See, e.g., Crank v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 692 S.W.2d 397 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
See also Lesmeister v. Dilly, 330 N.W.2d 95, 101-02 (Minn. 1983). Cf. In Re Certified Questions
from United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 416 Mich. 558, 331 N.W.2d 456 (1982).
44. Peterson v. Bendix Home Systems, Inc., 318 N.W.2d 50, 54 (Minn. 1982).
45. Id.
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isms,46 House Bill 700 should be interpreted as applying not merely to torts claims
but also to those warranty claims that provide remedies for similar types of
injuries.
III. PRODUCTS LIABILITY DEFENDANTS
In keeping with most jurisdictions, Missouri courts extended the reach of
strict liability to most of the parties involved in the chain of distribution.4 7 In its
definition of a products liability action, House Bill 700, section 33(1) provides
for no differentiation between defendants "wherever situated in the stream of
commerce." If this provision is to be interpreted as a general definition of
Missouri strict products liability law rather than a mere statement of the broad
applicability of the provisions of House Bill 700, liability now extends to all
transferors. Although the transfer must take place in the course of the transferor's
business, there appears to be no requirement that the defendant's business consist
of the transferring of such products.4 1
Just as this definition section may not have been intended to expand the
current liability of sellers, so section 34 may prove to be less than successful in
reducing the liability of some product conduits. The statute provides for the
dismissal of "[a] defendant whose liability is based solely on his status as a seller
in the stream of commerce."
The purpose of this new rule is to reduce the litigation costs of retailers (or
other mere conduits) who routinely are joined as co-defendants in products
liability cases brought primarily against manufacturers."' Its applicability is limited
to a "products liability claim in which another defendant, including the manu-
facturer, is properly before the court and from whom total recovery may be had
for plaintiff's claim. . . ."50
In this regard, the exact meaning of "another defendant" is problematic.
Take a case in which there is both a non-manufacturer products liability seller
defendant (our mere conduit who is a pharmacist dispensing a prescription drug)
and a non-products liability defendant (the physician who prescribed the drug).
Could the seller move for dismissal on the basis that "another defendant ...
[was] properly before the court"? Presumably, to achieve the apparent legislative
46. See, e.g., Sharp Bros. v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 703 S.W.2d 901 (Mo. 1986). For
a compelling exposition of the tort/warranty border, see East River S.S. Corp., 476 U.S. 858.
47. Cf. Wright v. Newman, 735 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1984); Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard,
Inc., 565 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); Williams v. Ford Motor Co., 494 S.W.2d 678 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1973). See also Commercial Distribution Center, Inc. v. St. Regis Paper Co., 689 S.W.2d 664
(Mo. Ct. App. 1985); Gunderson v. Sani-Kem Corp., 674 S.W.2d 665 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Hunt
v. Guarantee Elec. Co. of St. Louis, 667 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Chubb Group of Ins. Cos.
v. C.F. Murphy & Assocs., Inc., 656 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Racer v. Utterman, 629
S.W.2d 387, 399-400 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
48. Cf. Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 I11. App. 3d 480, 364 N.E.2d 502 (1977).
49. This provision is loosely based upon the Model Uniform Product Liability Act § 104.
50. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 34.2.
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intent, the court will have to read "another defendant" as "another [products
liability] defendant." A precondition to any order dismissing a mere conduit is
that another defendant is before the court "from whom total recovery may be
had for plaintiff's claim." 5 ' Thus, dismissal of a non-manufacturer should not
be granted where the product manufacturer defendant is not subject to process
under Missouri law or is insolvent.
Additionally, Missouri courts will have to develop criteria to determine when
a defendant's liability is "based solely on his status as a seller." At issue 2 will
be not only a seller's role with regard to the design or construction of the product
but also, for example, any alleged failure to pass on adequate warnings. 3
Likewise, sellers who do (or fail to do) more than act as mere conduits, will
usually face liability on negligence principles. Because the new dismissal provisions
apply only to strict liability counts, 4 an allegation of negligence against a mere
seller will preempt the new system. 5
An additional problem of interpretation concerns the defendant-beneficiaries
of the dismissal provisions. Modern products doctrine has evolved beyond the
51. Id.
52. Denial of such allegations must be made under oath according to the procedure outlined
in H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 34.3.
53. Consider, for example, Sliman v. Aluminum Co., 112 Idaho 277, 731 P.2d 1267 (1986)
(bottle cap supplier held to have duty, independent of bottler, to warn consumers that cap could fly
off and to provide instructions for safe removal).
54. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 34 only applies to a defendant in a "products liability
claim." Such a claim is defined in section 33 as one brought on a strict liability theory.
55. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 34 provides the procedure to be followed in cases where a
mere conduit seeks dismissal:
3. A defendant may move for dismissal under this section within the time for filing an
answer or other responsive pleading unless permitted by the court at a later time for good
cause shown. The motion shall be accompanied by an affidavit which shall be made under
oath and shall state that the defendant is aware of no facts or circumstances upon which
a verdict might be reached against him, other than his status as a seller in the stream of
commerce.
4. The parties shall have sixty days in which to conduct discovery on the issues raised in
the motion and affidavit. The court for good cause shown, may extend the time for
discovery, and may enter a protective order pursuant to the rules of civil procedure
regarding the scope of discovery on other issues.
5. Any party may move for a hearing on a motion to dismiss under this section. If the
requirements of subsections 2 and 3 of this section are met, and no party comes forward
at such a hearing with evidence of facts which would render the defendant seeking dismissal
under this section liable on some basis other than his status as a seller in the stream of
commerce, the court shall dismiss without prejudice the claim as to that defendant.
6. No order of dismissal under this section shall operate to divest a court of venue or
jurisdiction otherwise proper at the time the action was commenced. A defendant dismissed
pursuant to this section shall be considered to remain a party to such action only for such
purposes.
7. An order of dismissal under this section shall be interlocutory until final disposition of
plaintiff's claim by settlement or judgment and may be set aside for good cause shown at
anytime prior to such disposition.
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Restatement position of imposing liability on "sellers." Liability can be imposed
on lessors as well as sellers.5 6 However, a broad interpretation of "defendant"
for imposing liability will not necessarily apply to Missouri's new provision
excluding a mere "seller" from liability.17 Similar problems will be confronted
by other nonsellers seeking dismissal, such as bailors, licensors, franchisers and
non-immune employers.
IV. STATE OF THE ART EVIDENCE-"
Missouri has adopted the orthodox approach to distinguishing strict products
liability from its negligence predecessor. In strict liability cases the manufacturer's
foresight of the risk of harm is presumed.5 9 Further, the judgmental criteria that
are applied to the question of the product's defectiveness emphasize the issue of
safety rather than the reasonableness of the producer's conduct36 Contrary to
the position in most states, 61 Missouri has elected to retain the manipulatable
Restatement-based "defective condition unreasonably dangerous" standard as its
ultimate issue.6 2
Absent development of a meaningful test for legal defectiveness, 63 the Mis-
souri Supreme Court has lacked a context within which to judge the relevancy
56. See, e.g., Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 372 A.2d 736 (1977). See
generally Thorpe v. Robert F. Bullock, Inc., 179 Ga. App. 867, 348 S.E.2d 55 (1986).
57. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 33(1) defines product liability defendant in terms of someone
who "transferred" a product in the course of business. It is a difficult argument to make convincingly
that, in section 34, the far narrower word "seller" was intended to have the same meaning. For a
telling discussion of the broad meaning ascribed to sellers under the Restatement, see Perfection
Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 N.E.2d 681, 685-88 (1970).
58. See generally Robb, A Practical Approach to the Use of State of the Art Evidence in Strict
Products Liability Cases, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 1 (1982); Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of
Knowledge Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 734 (1983); St. Leger, Goggin & Brophy, Toxic
Torts: Workable Defenses Available to the Corporate Defendant, 28 Vnu.. L. REv. 1208, 1250 (1983);
Note, When the Best Defense is No Defense: The Future of State of the Art Evidence in Product
Liability Actions in Missouri, 50 Mo. L. REv. 438 (1985).
59. See generally Terry, Stricter Products Liability, 52 Mo. L. Rav. 1 (1987).
60. Id.
61. Nesselrode v. Executive Beechcraft, Inc., 707 S.W.2d 371, 378 n.ll (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
62. "Though Missouri has adopted the rule of strict tort liability as set forth in the Restatement,
we have not yet formally incorporated, in any meaningful way, the Restatement's Consumer
Expectation Test into the lexicon of our products liability law. Nor have we yet decided to travel or
required plaintiffs to travel the path of risks and utilities. And in this connection, we note that none
of the parties in the present case, at either the trial level or on appeal, has raised as an issue the
applicable standard by which to determine when a product as designed, is defective and therefore
actionable." Id. at 377-378 (footnote and citation omitted) (emphasis added). See generally Terry,
supra note 59, at 30-40 (1987). For a critical analysis of the various approaches to legal defectiveness,
see Twerski, From Risk-Utility to Consumer Expectations: Enhancing the Role of Judicial Screening
in Product Liability Litigation, 11 HoFsTRA L. Rav. 861 (1983).
63. For the distinction between "legal" and "factual" defectiveness, see Terry, supra note 59,
at 21-24.
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of state of the art evidence." Rather, it has adopted a blanket proscription on
the admissability of such evidence. 65 However, this total embargo has failed to
do justice to the complexity of the state of art concept." State of the art has at
least three different meanings in modern products liability litigation. These are
what may be termed industry practice, 67 industry capability, 68 and industry or
scientific knowability.69
It is arguable that the Missouri Supreme Court in both Elmore and Nesselrode
dealt only with the admissibility of state of the art evidence in the first sense.
The argument may be made that not only should state of the art evidence in the
second and third senses be admissible in a strict products liability action, but the
very issues posed by accepted definitions of unreasonably dangerous simply cannot
be addressed absent such evidence. 70
Furthermore, admitting evidence of industry capability (or, for that matter,
industry knowability in warning cases) involves neither the admissibility of in-
dustry custom nor the abrogation of that basic tenet of products doctrine-to
64. It is not intended to convey the impression that the supreme court has been neglectful in
its dealings with state of the art evidence. Several willful yet defensible motivations may be suggested.
First, the court may have decided that the subtleties of distinctions between various types of state of
the art evidence would be impossible for the jury to understand. Therefore, the total ban on such
evidence constitutes something of a prophylactic rule. Second, the court may have decided that such
defensive use of that evidence would interfere with what the court saw as the redistributive goal of
modern products liability doctrine.
65. Nesselrode, 707 S.W.2d at 383 ("[L]iability may be imposed without regard to the defen-
dant's knowledge or conduct. This view comports with the very raison d'etre of strict tort liability
law. In Elmore, we reaffirmed the principle that strict tort liability is not predicated on the presence
of fault or the existence of knowledge." (citations omitted)); Lippard v. Houdaille Industrs., Inc.,
715 S.W.2d 491, 492 (Mo. 1986) (en banc); Elmore, 673 S.W.2d at 438 ("the law in Missouri holds
that state of the art evidence has no bearing on the outcome of a strict liability claim."); Klein, 714
S.W.2d at 905; Johnson v. Hannibal Mower Corp., 679 S.W.2d 884 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984).
66. See generally Birnbaum & Wrubel, "State of the Art" and Strict Products Liability, 21
TORT & INs. L. J. 30, 37-38 (1985); Calnan, Perpetuating Negligence Principles in Strict Products
Liability: The Use of State of the Art Concepts in Design Cases, 36 Smcusa L. Rav. 797 (1985);
Wade, supra note 58; Robb, supra note 58.
67. The generally accepted and, thus, customary practices of the defendant's particular industry
at the time the product was manufactured.
68. Not merely the customary practices of the industry in question, but rather the technology
available to the defendant's industry at the time of manufacture. Some defendants add an additional
complication to this type, drawing a distinction between industry knowability at the time of trial and
at the time of marketing.
69. The knowledge or discoverability at the time of manufacture of the risks associated with
the product.
70. See, e.g., McLaughlin v. Sikorsky Aircraft, 148 Cal. App. 3d 203, 195 Cal. Rptr. 764, 767
(1983). Cf. Couch v. Mine Safety Appliances Co., 107 Wash. 2d 232, 728 P.2d 585 (1986) (en banc).
See also Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987). (Evidence of feasible alternative
design held to be not always required. An unimprovable product could be so dangerous as to warrant
its removal from the marketplace).
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judge the product, not the manufacturer. 7' House Bill 700 has left open the
admissibility of "industry capability" evidence by providing that "[this section
shall not be construed to permit or prohibit evidence of feasibility in products
liability claims." ' 72 The Governor's Task Force saw "this as a separate issue, one
upon [which] it is not making a specific recommendation to the General As-
sembly." 73
Only in warning cases74 involving evidence of industry knowability does the
statute overturn recent pronouncements of the Missouri Supreme Court.7 House
Bill 700 provides: "[als used in this section, 'state of the art' means that the
dangerous nature of the product was not known and could not reasonably be
discovered at the time the product was placed into the stream of commerce. ' 76
Interestingly, while the defense bar has been arguing inaccurately for a state of
the art "defense, ' 77 this is exactly what the Missouri legislature has produced,
allocating the burden of proof as to scientific unknowability to the defendant. 71
Because the legislation restricts the admissibility of "scientific knowability"
evidence to marketing defect cases, 79 the traditional, "constructive foresight"
distinction between negligence and strict liability is preserved in most products
liability cases. It is only in marketing cases that there is now some uncertainty
with regard to the distinction between negligence and strict liability theories. 0
71. See, e.g., Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 79 Ill. App. 2d 203, 402 N.E.2d 194, 198 (1980):
We perceive that requiring a plaintiff to plead and prove that the defendant manufacturer
knew or should have known of the danger that caused the injury, and that the defendant
manufacturer failed to warn plaintiff of that danger, is a reasonable requirement, and one
which focuses on the nature of the product and on the adequacy of the warning, rather
than on the conduct of the manufacturer.
72. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 35.4.
73. Final Report, supra note 7, at 382.
74. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 35.2. "The state of the art shall be a complete defense and
relevant evidence only in an action based upon strict liability for failure to warn of the dangerous
condition of a product."
75. Thus, commentators have been cheated of the answers to at least two questions. First,
given that the issue of industry knowability in warning cases had never been briefed before the
supreme court, would such a Draconian stance have been adopted? Second, even if it had, would
the supreme court have backed down from this position as did its brother court in New Jersey? See
Beshada v. Johns-Manville Products Corp., 90 N.J. 191, 447 A.2d 539 (1982). Cf. Feldman v. Lederle
Laboratories, 97 N.J. 429, 479 A.2d 374 (1984). See generally In re Asbestos Litig., 628 F. Supp.
774 (D.N.J. 1986) (Equal protection challenge premised on the distinctive treatment meted out to the
asbestos industry by New Jersey products liability doctrine).
76. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 35.1.
77. Inaccurate, because the evidence they have sought to introduce goes to issues on which
plaintiff traditionally has the burden of proof.
78. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 35.2.
79. Id.
80. This conceptual difficulty has not been aided by remarks of the Governor's Task Force
that the most important distinction remaining after H.B. 700 was that, under a negligence theory,
the plaintiff could bring an action for failure to warn of a defect discovered after manufacture and
sale. Final Report, supra note 7, at 382.
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What is certain is that failure to warn allegations will cease to be routinely
pleaded by plaintiffs.
A further complication not dealt with by the legislature concerns the appli-
cability of defensive state of the art evidence in cases involving punitive damage
claims. In a punitive damage claim liability will depend upon the defendant
having actual knowledge that the product was defective and unreasonably dan-
gerous at the time of sale. Regardless of how the Missouri Supreme Court
disposes of the admissability of industry capability evidence in design defect
cases, it will be forced to admit such state of the art evidence in the punitive
damage context. As the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit remarked:
"Clearly, whether or not [defendants] followed industry standards and complied
with the state of the art. . .is probative on the issue of the wantonness, willfulness
and maliciousness of their acts. .. ."I' The bifurcation provision contained in
House Bill 7002 does not deal with this evidentiary issue. Under that provision,
liability for punitive damages is decided at the same time as liability for com-
pensatory damages.
V. COMPARATIVE FAULT AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY
A. In General
Of all of the reforms introduced by House Bill 700, the introduction of a
statutory form of comparative fault for products liability cases will have the most
dramatic impact on the practical application of the substantive law of Missouri.
For the first time since the supreme court renewed its active interest in tort law
in 1983,3 the value of some cases has been reduced and the defense has been
given a powerful new tool to use both at trial and in settlement conferences.
According to the Restatement,8 4 contributory negligence is not a defense in
a strict products liability action.85 However, contributory fault is recognized as a
defense. While "contributory negligence raises questions about the plaintiff's
reasonable, objective knowledge, contributory fault raises questions about the
81. Reed v. Tiffin Motor Homes, Inc., 697 F.2d 1192, 1198 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying law of
South Carolina). See also Smith v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 755 F.2d 129,133 (8th Cir. 1985)
(workplace regulations admissible to rebut, inter alia, plaintiff's argument as to punitive damages).
Compare the analogous reasoning of the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stating: "Evidence
of post-sale knowledge of a defect may not be the basis for punitive damages based on strict liability
for failure to warn." Hale v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 756 F.2d 1322, 1336 (8th Cir. 1985)
(applying law of Missouri).
82. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 39.2.
83. See generally Terry, supra note 59.
84. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
85. See generally Vargo, The Defenses to Strict Liability in Tort: A New Vocabulary With An
Old Meaning, 29 MERCER L. REV. 447 (1978).
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plaintiff's actual, subjective knowledge." 's 6 As an affirmative defense that involves
"fine-tuning" based on concerns that are "subjective, conscious and personal to
the plaintiff, '8 7 contributory fault is closely related to the well-established defense
of assumption of risk. Indeed, as the court of appeals has stated, "for contrib-
utory fault instructions, to be proper, there must be evidence of awareness or
knowledge of the precise danger in the defect asserted by the plaintiff, who
thereafter voluntarily assumes the risk of that danger." 8 No Missouri opinion
has levelled any serious challenge to this narrow circumscription of the contrib-
utory fault defense. 9
Missouri consistently rejected contributory negligence as having any appli-
cability in products liability cases. 90 However, after the Missouri Supreme Court
adopted the principles of comparative negligence in Gustafson v. Benda,91 it was
generally presumed that Missouri would follow the majority of states and apply
that concept to strict products liability claims. 92 Indeed, after Gustafson, the
federal courts took the view that Missouri would adopt the comparative ap-
proach. 93 Such a conclusion was reinforced by the Gustafson court's apparent
86. Peterson v. Auto Wash Mfg. & Supply Co., 676 F.2d 949, 953 (8th Cir. 1982) (applying
Missouri law). See also MAI 32.23-Contributory Fault, which provides:
Your verdict must be for defendant if you believe:
First, when the (describe product) was used, plaintiff knew of the danger as submitted...
and appreciated the danger of its use, and
Second, plaintiff voluntarily and unreasonably exposed himself to such danger, and
Third, such conduct directly caused or directly contributed to cause any damage plaintiff
may have sustained.
87. Jackson v. Coast Paint & Lacquer Co., 499 F.2d 809, 815 (9th Cir. 1974). Note, however,
that,
[Wihile the test to be applied in determining whether a user has assumed the risk of using
a product known to be dangerously defective is fundamentally a subjective test, in the
sense that it is his knowledge, understanding and appreciation of the danger which must
be assessed, rather than that of the reasonably prudent person, it must also be remembered
that this is ordinarily a question to determined by the jury. That determination is not to
be made solely on the basis of the user's own statements but rather upon the jury's
assessment of all of the facts established by the evidence.
Williams v. Brown Mfg. Co., 45 Ill. 2d 418, 261 N.E.2d 305, 312 (1970) (citation omitted).
88. Uder v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n Inc., 668 S.W.2d 82, 89 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983). See also
Klein v. R.D. Werner Co., Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 316, 654 P.2d 94, 95-96 (1982) (en banc).
89. See, e.g., England v. Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 728 F.2d 1026 (8th Cir. 1984); Jarrell v. Fort
Worth Steel & Mfg. Co., 666 S.W.2d 828, 833-34 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); Lewis v. Envirotech Corp.,
674 S.W.2d 105 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984), Williams v. Deere & Co., 598 S.W.2d 609, 613 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1980).
90. Rogers v. Toro Mfg. Co., 522 S.W.2d 632, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). Obviously, contrib-
utory (or comparative) negligence is relevant when plaintiff brings a products liability action based
on a negligence theory. See Smith v. Fiber Controls Corp., 300 N.C. 669, 268 S.E.2d 504 (1980).
91. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
92. See, e.g., Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454 N.E.2d 197 (1983) (containing
exhaustive review of authorities). See generally Annot., 9 A.L.R. 4th 633 (1981).
93. See, e.g., Gearhart v. Uniden Corp., 718 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1986).
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adoption of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.94 Specifically, section 1(a) of
the Uniform Act provides:
In an action based on fault seeking to recover damages for injury or death to
person or harm to property, any contributory fault chargeable to the claimant
diminishes proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages for an
injury attributable to the claimant's contributory fault, but does not bar recovery.
This rule applies whether or not under prior law the claimant's contributory fault
constituted a defense or was disregarded under applicable legal doctrines, such
as last clear chance.
In describing the application of these principles, the Commissioners' Comment
states: "'Fault'. . .includes conduct of the plaintiff or other claimant as well as
the defendant. . . .Contributory fault diminishes recovery whether it was pre-
viously a bar or not, as, for example, in the case of ordinary contributory
negligence in an action based on strict liability . . . . 9
Any such suppositions as to the state of Missouri law were rudely destroyed
by the supreme court's decision in Lippard v. Houdaille Industries, Inc.96 Over
fierce dissents the supreme court stated "[t]he plaintiff's contributory negligence
is not at issue in a products liability case. It should neither defeat nor diminish
recovery."
97
In Lippard, the defendant argued that the affirmative defense of comparative
negligence should be used in situations where the court had previously denied
the application of the principles of contributory negligence. The supreme court,
however, failed to address a somewhat different situation. Suppose a plaintiff
was faced by a defense of contributory fault that was supported by evidence on
the record. Could she not argue that, rather than constituting a complete bar to
recovery, her less than exemplary conduct should raise only the question of her
comparative fault? In Lippard, Judge Blackmar recognized the existence of the
issue but did not address its solution. 9 Nevertheless, indications were that such
a change would have been resisted. 99
B. Statutory Comparative Fault
House Bill 700 provides for abrogation of contributory fault,' ° and adoption
94. Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15-16.
95. UNIFORM CoMPARATvE FAULT ACT, § 1 comment (b) 12 U.L.A. 38 (Supp. 1987) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter cited as UCFA].
96. 715 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Mo. 1986) (en banc).
97. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 493. For a summary of the position in other jurisdictions, see
Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 425-26 (Tex. 1984).
98. Lippard, 715 S.W.2d at 493 n.2.
99. See Barnes v. Tools & Mach. Builders, Inc., 715 S.W.2d 518, 522 n.l (Mo. 1986) (en banc)
(Blackmar, J., Higgins and Rendlen, JJ., concurring). The issue remains open even after H.B. 700
in negligence products liability cases. Will Gustafson and the Uniform Comparative Fault Act § l(b)
have the effect of introducing comparative principles into such cases? For a collection of cases dealing
with this issue in other jurisdictions, see Annot., 16 A.L.R. 4th 700 (1982).
100. Contributory fault, as a complete bar to plaintiff's recovery in a products liability claim,
is abolished. The doctrine of pure comparative fault shall apply to products liability claims as provided
in this section. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.1.
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of comparative fault.0 1 In returning Missouri law to, arguably, its pre-Lippard
state, fresh impetus will be given to the post-Gustafson debate as to how closely
Missouri law is to be modeled after the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
02
One question that will arise is the basis for comparison under this new
comparative fault system. 10 3 The application of a literal comparative negligence
test would run into the criticism that comparing a negligent plaintiff with a
strictly liable product defendant' 1 would be akin to comparing apples with
oranges. 05 The Uniform Act adopts a slightly different approach-comparative
causation.1l 6 "In determining the percentages of fault, the trier of fact shall
consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the extent of
the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed.' ' 0 7 The
application of this admixture of ingredients of comparative fault and comparative
causation in products liability cases has been described as follows: "[Tihe trier
of fact is to compare the harm caused by the defective product with the harm
caused by the negligence of the other defendant, any settling tortfeasors and the
plaintiff." 'o
The statutory comparative fault provision lists six examples of plaintiff's-°
101. Defendant may plead and prove the fault of the plaintiff as an affirmative defense. Any
fault chargeable to the plaintiff shall diminish proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory
damages but shall not bar recovery. Id. at § 36.2.
102. In Gustafson, 661 S.W.2d at 15, Judge Welliver had been responsible for the phrase that
had caused the considerable disagreement evident in Lippard when he stated, "[i]nsofar as possible
this and future cases shall apply the doctrine of pure comparative fault in accordance with the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act §§ 1-6 .. " (emphasis added).
103. See generally Sobelsohn, Comparing Fault, 60 IND. L.J. 413, 426-35 (1985).
104. Of course, it is arguable that this is the wrong inquiry. A somewhat different and attractive
approach is to abandon altogether the pretense of comparing the plaintiff with the defendant. Instead,
the plaintiff's conduct should be compared to the hypothetical reasonable person. See generally
Sandford v. Chevrolet Div. of General Motors, 292 Or. 590, 642 P.2d 624, 628-35 (1982).
105. An early reference to this species of argument is to be found in the leading comparative
fault case of Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 1167, 144 Cal. Rptr.
380 (1978): "The task of merging the two concepts is said to be impossible, that 'apples and oranges'
cannot be compared, that 'oil and water' do not mix, and that strict liability, which is not founded
on negligence or fault, is inhospitable to comparative fault principles."
106. Such an approach also should serve to emphasize that no question of comparing any fault
may arise unless and until defendant establishes causal negligence against the plaintiff. See Moe v.
Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 925 (10th Cir. 1984); Wooderson v. Ortho
Pharmaceutical Corp., 235 Kan. 387, 681 P.2d 1038 (1984).
107. UCFA, supra note 95, at § 2(b).
108. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 427. See also Murray v. Fairbanks Morse, 610 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.
1979) (applying law of the Virgin Islands); Mauch v. Manufacturers Sales & Service Inc., 345 N.W.2d
338 (N.D. 1984). See generally Gershonowitz, Comparative Causation As An Alternative To, Not A
Part Of, Comparative Fault In Strict Products Liability, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 483 (1986).
109. The statute provides that the "[d]efendant may plead and prove the fault of the plaintiff
as an affirmative defense." Thus, concern is raised as to the traditional application of the imputed
contributory defense in the products liability context. Such a defense would arise, for example, in
the employment or wrongful death situation. The continued vitality of this defense is probably
guaranteed by the second sentence of this section which provides that "[alny fault chargeable to the
[Vol. 56, No. 2
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substandard behavior: 10 unanticipated use,' unintended use, 12 contributory
fault, '13 constructive contributory fault," 4 contributory negligence" 5 and failure
to mitigate." 6 These specific examples, therefore, provide for four general species
of conduct: product misuse' 7-sometimes called abnormal use, assumption of
risk,"" failure to use reasonable care"19 and failure to mitigate.' E° Of these, the
plaintiff shall diminish proportionately the amount awarded as compensatory damages .. " See
UCFA, supra note 95, at § 1 Comment providing that "contributory fault chargeable to the claimant"
includes "legally imputed fault . . .and a wrongful-death action."
110. The Texas Supreme Court has adopted a similar scheme, whereby previously distinct
affirmative defenses are treated as examples of plaintiff fault. See Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 428. Cf.
Simpson v. General Motors Corp., 108 II. 2d 146, 483 N.E.2d 1 (1985) (Illinois refuses to include
plaintiff's negligent behavior in its comparative causation regime). For a somewhat different statutory
regime, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1979).
111. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.3(l) provides: "The failure to use the product as reasonably
anticipated by the manufacturer." In the Senate, an amendment to this subsection had been proposed:
"Use of the product in a manner for which the product is not adapted and where such use is not
reasonably anticipated by a reasonable manufacturer." The amendment subsequently was withdrawn.
Mo. SENATE J., March 3, 1987, at 348.
112. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.3(2) provides: "Use of the product for a purpose not
intended by the manufacturer."
113. Id. at § 36.3(3) provides: "Use of the product with knowledge of a danger involved in
such use with reasonable appreciation of the consequences and the voluntary and unreasonable
exposure to said danger."
114. Id. at § 36.3(4) provides: "Unreasonable failure to appreciate the danger involved in use
of the product or the consequences thereof and the unreasonable exposure to said danger."
115. Id. at § 36.3(5) provides: "The failure to undertake the precautions a reasonably careful
user of the product would take to protect himself against dangers which he would reasonably
appreciate under the same or similar circumstances."
116. Id. at § 36.3(6) provides: "The failure to mitigate damages."
117. Just as defendants tend to speak in broad terms with regard to, for instance, the state of
the art "defense," so also are they inclined to include several different concepts within their statement
of product misuse. The distinction between misuse (foreseeable use) as part of plaintiff's case and
misuse (abnormal use) as part of defendant's case is discussed infra, notes 122-32.
118. Conceptually this type of case is quite simple because it will track existing Missouri doctrine
dealing with contributory fault. Thus, defendant will have to establish plaintiff's knowledge of the
danger, her appreciation of the danger, and her voluntary exposure to it. H.B. 700, supra note 15,
at § 36.3(3). Additionally, a new form of contributory fault which falls on the assumption of risk/
contributory negligence borderline has been introduced, based as it is on an unreasonable failure to
appreciate a danger. Id. at § 36.3(4). Missouri thereby avoids many of the problems that have
occurred in other jurisdictions as to the types of assumption of risk that are to be subsumed under
a comparative fault regime. See, e.g., Jones v. M.T.D. Products, Inc., 507 F. Supp. 8 (M.D. Pa.
1980), aff'd, 649 F.2d 859 (3d Cir. 1981); Zahrte v. Sturm Ruger & Co., 203 Mont. 90, 661 P.2d
17 (1983).
119. This would include negligence per se.
120. Presumably this provision should be read as providing for an affirmative defense in cases
where there has been a failure to take reasonable steps to mitigate damages. See, e.g., Graffunder
v. City of Mahtomedi, 376 N.W.2d 282 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). The defendants negligently failed to
prevent sewage back-ups onto plaintiff's property. Plaintiff might have eliminated or reduced his
damages if he had installed a back-check valve. The court held that this did not constitute failure to
mitigate given (i) the questionable effect that the valve would have had and (ii) the relatively high
cost of the valve in comparison with the injuries suffered.
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misuse and absence of due care provisions involve the most exacting practical
questions and, because of their pro-defense leaning, seem destined to have the
most profound distributive effects.
C. Product Misuse
House Bill 700 suggests that in the future the use (or misuse) of the product
will not only continue to arise in plaintiff's case, but also will be a basis for an
affirmative defense of comparative fault. Thus a most difficult question is posed.
Logically, may the issue of reasonably anticipated use arise both as part of
plaintiff's case' 21 and also as part of defendant's case? 122 Most likely this argument
will arise in a plaintiff's argument either that the legislature's adoption of an
affirmative defense of misuse has deleted the converse from plaintiff's case, or
that having proved this use was foreseeable as part of her case it would be
illogical to permit defendant to re-argue the issue.
However, the new statute appears to confirm Missouri's position at common
law 23 that a crucial aspect of a products liability claim is proving that "Itihe
product was used in a manner reasonably anticipated."'' 24 The argument will be
made that section 33, the definition section of this part of House Bill 700, is not
a codification of the common law, but rather is a mere statement as to the
general applicability of the sections 125 that follow. Yet this seems to run counter
to the clear wording of the statute. Furthermore, the issue of the utilization of
the product 26 does not occur in plaintiff's case by accident. A product's legal
defectiveness must be judged within the context of its utilization.27 This is
doctrinally expressed as requiring an initial determination of whether the product
is defective for its reasonably anticipated (or foreseeable) use. 12
At common law the issue of foreseeable use (or misuse), strictu sensu, did
not recur as part of defendant's case. Therefore, when a court endorsed "product
misuse" as an affirmative defense, 29 it was making an inaccurate reference to
121. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 33(2).
122. Id. at § 36.3(1).
123. Klein, 714 S.W.2d at 900.
124. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 33(2).
125. Dealing with state of the art and comparative fault.
126. Of course, defendants always will insist that any unintended use of the product should not
involve liability. Missouri, however, uses an objective, foresight approach. In that regard it should
be noted that reasonably foreseeable use and reasonably anticipated use appear to be interchangeable.
See generally Terry, supra note 59, at 4143. Noel, Defective Products: Abnormal Use, Contributory
Negligence, and Assumption of Risk, 25 VA". L. REv. 93 (1972).
127. This is the case whether the risk-utility or the consumer expectations test is being utilized.
128. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Hopkins, 548 S.W.2d 344, 349 (Tex. 1977). See also
Williams, 261 N.E.2d at 309.
129. For an example of defendant's burden in such a case, see Harville v. Anchor-Wate Co.,
663 F.2d 598 (5th Cir. 1981) (applying law of Texas).
[T]he defense of misuse is asserted after a product is found to have been unreasonably
dangerous, and this defect is found to be a producing cause of the injury. Then the
[Vol. 56, No. 2
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conduct which constituted the recognized affirmative defenses of assumption of
risk (contributory fault) 30 or, in some jurisdictions, comparative negligence. 3
Consider the following hypothetical. A manufacturer distributes an auto-
mobile fitted with original equipment tires that are capable of speeds up to 100
miles per hour. The vehicle itself is capable of speeds up to 120 miles per hour.
The tire has a remediable design defect which appears at 115 miles per hour, at
which speed the tire suffers a blow out and the vehicle crashes injuring the
plaintiff. Presume that plaintiff will be able to meet her burden of proof that
driving at 115 miles per hour was a foreseeable use,'3 2 that the product (the
vehicle fitted with those tires) was defective and unreasonably dangerous, and
that the defect was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries. Consider the
following scenarios and the defensive postures that the manufacturer could take
under the new Missouri law.
(i) The plaintiff was a bystander. Unless she had a relationship with the
driver of the vehicle such that the driver's fault was chargeable to her,'33 the
defendant would be without an affirmative defense. In particular, the issue of
foreseeable or intended use could not be resuscitated.
(ii) The plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle. Her injuries would have
been reduced if she had worn her seat belt. Defendant should be able to raise
the issue of her fault in her failure to mitigate damages. 3 4
defendant must establish that (1) the use or misuse of the product was neither intended
nor reasonably foreseeable from the manufacturer's or supplier's perspective, (2) the plaintiff
could reasonably foresee an injury occurring as a result of the misuse, and (3) the misuse
was a producing cause of the injury.
Id. at 602-03.
130. The distinction between unforeseeable use and assumption of risk has been clarified as
follows:
The problem appears to us to be one of failing to differentiate between misuse of a product
which does not exhibit any defective condition until misused, or which does not appear to
be defective and unreasonably dangerous, and misuse of a product when the defective and
unreasonably dangerous condition is either discovered by the consumer or brought to his
attention by a legally sufficient warning. While in either situation a product is being
misused, the former constitutes the true category of misuse while the latter form of misuse
is tantamount to the traditional concepts of incurred or assumed risk.
Perfection Paint & Color Co. v. Konduris, 147 Ind. App. 106, 258 (1970).
131. See, e.g., Daly, 575 P.2d at 1168-69.
132. See, e.g., LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 451 F. Supp. 253 (W.D. La. 1978),
aff'd, 623 F.2d 985 (5th Cir. 1980).
133. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.2.
134. Id. at § 36.3(6). See generally Mo. REv. STAT. § 307.178(3) (1986) which provides that:
In any action to recover damages arising out of the ownership, common maintenance or
operation of a motor vehicle, failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section shall,
not be considered evidence of comparative negligence. Failure to wear a safety belt in
violation of this section may be admitted to mitigate damages, but only under the following
circumstances:
(1) Parties seeking to introduce evidence of the failure to wear a safety belt in violation
of this section must first introduce expert evidence proving that a failure to wear a safety
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(iii) The plaintiff was a passenger in the vehicle. The driver was intoxicated.
Defendant will argue either assumption of risk"' or constructive assumption of
risk, 36 depending, inter alia, upon the plaintiff's knowledge of the intoxica-
tion. 117
(iv) The plaintiff was the driver of the vehicle. The defendant will argue
that the failure to steer the vehicle following the blow-out constituted contributory
negligence. 138
All of these examples involve the utilization of traditional doctrinal routes3 9
to identify, and then screen out from full redistribution, risks incurred by certain
individuals who had good accident, and accident cost, avoidance potential.' ° The
same cannot be said for Missouri's new product misuse defense 4 which creates
something of a dilemma. The defense is not a replacement for plaintiff's fore-
seeable use burden. 42 Neither does it constitute inaccurate shorthand for some
other recognized affirmative defense. 43 Rather, it appears to constitute an ex-
humation of the issue of anticipated use which previously had been disposed.
(v) The plaintiff was the driver. The defendant raises as her affirmative
defense that the vehicle was being driven at 115 miles per hour and alleges that
this constituted unintended or unanticipated use.
This raises several difficult questions. First, logically how can this identical
issue be raised again by the defendant? Arguably, different issues arise when a
belt contributed to the injuries claimed by plaintiff;
(2) If the evidence supports such a finding, the trier of fact may find that the plaintiff's
failure to wear a safety belt in violation of this section contributed to the plaintiff's claimed
injuries, and may reduce the amount of plaintiff's recovery by an amount not to exceed
one percent of the damages awarded after any reductions for comparative negligence.
(emphasis added).
135. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.3(3).
136. Id. at § 36.3(4).
137. See, e.g., Miller v. Eaton, 733 S.W.2d 31 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (giving of comparative fault
instruction in automobile accident case is proper if there is evidence that plaintiff passenger knew or
reasonably should have known of the danger posed by the defendant driver's impairment due to
alcohol and had remained in the vehicle).
138. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.3(5). See infra text accompanying note 150.
139. Obviously, whether such a defense is permitted is jurisdiction-sensitive. At common law,
Missouri permitted only the defense of contributory fault (assumption of risk). See supra text
accompanying notes 89-97.
140. See, e.g., Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 425. See generally G. CAL"aasi, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS,
131 et seq. (1977).
141. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.3(1) provides: "The failure to use the product as reasonably
anticipated by the manufacturer." Id. at § 36.3(2) provides: "Use of the product for a purpose not
intended by the manufacturer."
142. See supra text accompanying notes 123-28.
143. The only possibilities would be conduct that would constitute contributory negligence,
assumption of risk, constructive assumption of risk or failure to mitigate. Yet all of these are
independently recognized as affirmative defenses by the statute. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.3(3)-
(6).
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court is being asked to reduce plaintiff's recovery rather than deny all recovery. '"
Furthermore, courts may take a very broad interpretation of anticipated use in
the plaintiff's case, but a narrow one with regard to defendant's argument of
unanticipated use. 1
45
Second, the traditional examples of plaintiff's behavior adopted by the statute
all involve what we have come to understand as plaintiff's blameworthiness, or
fault. Thus, the question arises whether the unintended or unanticipated use of
the product also must involve blameworthiness.' 4 6 The examples of plaintiff's
conduct given by the statute are not definitions. Rather, section 36.3 states that
'fault' is limited to [the examples].' ' 47 Indeed, blameworthiness must be con-
sidered a sine qua non for the finding of product misuse. 148 Otherwise, the court
will be unable to distinguish between the typical speeding driver and the ambulance
driver trying to deliver a critically ill patient to the hospital. In neither case,
after all, does the manufacture intend the vehicle to be driven at 115 miles per
hour. Furthermore, absent some fault in the plaintiff, the trier of fact has no
rational basis upon which to "diminish proportionately the amount awarded."1 49
D. Comparative Negligence
Whatever the conceptual difficulties with the affirmative defense of product
misuse, the provision introducing a defense based on a failure to take reasonable
care may well have the greater impact. Perhaps few would quarrel with the
proposition that the driver of a vehicle which begins to go out of control because
of a defect in the steering mechanism should be placed under a reasonable care
standard in applying the vehicle's brakes. 50 However, far more difficult questions
arise as to whether the defendant will be permitted to establish an alleged lack
144. Texas law has long recognized a comparative defense of unforeseeable product misuse. See
Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 423.
145. Such a situation would be analogous to the construction of language in certain insurance
policies. See, e.g., State Farm Mutual Ins. Co. v. Partridge, 10 Cal. 3d 94, 514 P.2d 123, 109 Cal.
Rptr. 811 (1973) (insuring clause interpreted widely; similarly worded exclusionary clause interpreted
narrowly). See also Brister v. American Indem. Co., 313 So. 2d 335 (La. Ct. App. 1975) (in
exclusionary clause "automobile" did not include motorcycle). Cf. Thibodeaux v. St. Paul Mercury
Ins. Co., 242 So. 2d 112 (La. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 243 So. 2d 533 (La. 1971) (in insuring clause
"automobile" included motorcycle).
146. See, e.g., Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 423 ("Assumed risk and unforeseeable misuse, however,
are nothing more than extreme variants of contributory negligence. To varying degrees, all three
defenses focus on the reasonableness of the defendant's conduct").
147. Emphasis added. Consider further H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.2 which suggests that
the fault of the plaintiff is key. Cf. Final Report, supra note 7, at 376, ("If the plaintiff's conduct
is determined by the jury to fit one or more of these categories, it would then be defined as 'fault."')
148. Cf. N.Y. Cirv. PRAc. LAW, § 1411 (McKinney 1976) utilizing the phrase "culpable conduct"
as the collective description for plaintiff conduct which leads to reduction of damages.
149. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 36.2.
150. See, e.g., Busch v. Busch Constr., 262 N.W.2d 377 (Minn. 1977).
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of reasonable care'' merely by showing, for example, a failure to inspect for
defects, the failure to discover a defect, or a failure to guard against a possible
defect. 5 2 What is certain is that in conjunction with the provisions dealing with
product misuse, the contributory negligence provision will lead to a significant
reduction in the value of most products liability claims involving injuries suffered
in agricultural' and industrial settings. 5 4
VI. PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The reform relating to punitive damages is of general applicability in that it
applies not only to products liability cases' 55 but also to most other tort claims.
151. Quaere the standard of reasonable care for a child or an unsophisticated person in such a
case. See, e.g., Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980) (4 year old incapable
of comparative fault). See also Lewis v. Timco, Inc., 736 F.2d 163 (5th Cir. 1984) (untutored worker
dealing with complex equipment).
152. Some jurisdictions expressly exclude these situations from their comparative fault regimes.
See, e.g., West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976); Coney, 97 Ill. 2d 104, 454
N.E.2d 197; Austin v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 471 A.2d 280, 288 (Me. 1984); Busch, 262 N.W.2d
377; Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 432; Star Furniture Co. v. Pulaski Furniture Co. 297 S.E.2d 854 (W.Va.
1982). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n. (1965).
153. Cases such as Love v. Deere & Co., 720 S.W.2d 786 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
154. Of course, there will be a small number of cases that will see a pro-plaintiff swing. Consider,
for example, a clear contributory fault situation which would not have reached the jury.
155. Defense interests have long targeted the law relating to punitive damages for reform.
However, according to a recent study by the American Bar Foundation, only 2.8 percent of punitive
damage cases included a punitive component. Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 394.
For Missouri, the modern law dealing with the recovery of punitive damages in strict products
liability cases begins with Racer v. Utterman, 629 S.W.2d 387 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981), cert. denied and
appeal dismissed, Racer v. Johnson & Johnson, 459 U.S. 803 (1982). In addition to denying that
there was any fundamental inconsistency between strict liability in tort and punitive damages, Racer,
629 S.W.2d at 396, the Missouri Court of Appeals held that for a plaintiff to recover punitive
damages in a strict products liability action, she had to prove that, "the defendant was... aware
that [the product] was unreasonably dangerous when used as intended, and . . . was . . . indifferent
to or in conscious disregard for the safety of others in marketing the product." Racer, 629 S.W.2d
at 397. See also Bhagvandoss v. Biersdorf, Inc., 723 S.W.2d 392, 397-98 (Mo. 1987).
Following Racer, two new instructions were approved for use. MAI section 10.04 [1983 New]
Damages-Exemplary-Strict Liability-Either Product Defect or Failure to Warn Submitted)
If you find in favor of plaintiff under Instruction Number (Here insert number of plaintiff's
strict liability verdict directing instruction) and if you believe:
First, at the time defendant sold the (describe product), defendant knew of the [defective
condition and danger] [danger] submitted in Instruction Number (Here insert number of
plaintiff's strict liability verdict directing instruction), and
Second, defendant thereby showed complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the
safety of others, then in addition to any damages to which you may find plaintiff entitled
under Instruction Number (Here insert number of plaintiff's damage instruction) you may
award plaintiff an additional amount as punitive damages in such sum as you believe will
serve to punish defendant and to deter defendant and others from like conduct. (Footnotes
omitted)
MAI 10.05 [1983 New] is conceptually similar and deals with submission on both manufacturing/
design defect and marketing defect theories.
TORT REFORM A CT
The new provision does not, however, apply to actions against health care
providers. 5 6 It has only partial effect in cases involving most intentional torts.1
5 7
A. Bifurcated Procedure
The most radical departure from current practice concerns the introduction
of a bifurcated procedure for punitive damage cases "if requested by any
party."' The first stage determines liability and assesses compensatory dam-
ages.5 9 The second stage, using the same jury,'
60 determines punitive damages.' 6 1
Evidence of financial worth 62 is inadmissible at the first (liability) stage of any
such bifurcated proceedings, "unless admissible for a proper purpose other than
the amount of punitive damages,"' 63 but is admissible in the second (quantifi-
cation) stage. 64
B. Judicial Control of Punitive Damage Awards
Additionally, resurrected remittitur and additur apply to punitive damage
awards. 65 However, they will not operate in the same way as in compensatory
situations. 66 First, the punitive provision refers to remittitur or additur "based
on the trial judge's assessment of the totality of the surrounding circumstan-
ces." 1 67 In other words, the procedure codifies the concept of the judge as the
"thirteenth juror." In contrast, the general remittitur and additur provision is
phrased in terms broad enough to include appellate remittitur 61 Second, the
156. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 45. Prior to the 1986 malpractice legislation, a punitive
damage claim required a showing of "complete indifference to or conscious disregard for the safety
of others." MAI 10.02. See generally Smith v. Courter, 575 S.W.2d 199, 206-08 (Mo. Ct. App.
1978). Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.210(5) now provides that "an award of punitive damages against a
health care provider ...shall be made only upon a showing by a plaintiff that the health care
provider demonstrated willful, wanton or malicious misconduct with respect to his actions."
157. The credit provision is inapplicable in this context. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 39(5).
158. Id. at § 39.1.
159. Id. at § 39.2.
160. Id. at § 39.1. A nice point arises as to whether the trial judge may overturn a jury verdict
on liability based on evidence admitted in the second stage. See, e.g., Stevenson v. General Motors
Corp., 513 Pa. 41, 521 A.2d 413 (1987).
161. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 39.3.
162. While section 39(2) refers to evidence of "financial condition," section 39(3) refers to
evidence of the defendant's net worth. It is not clear that anything was meant to turn on this
distinction. Nevertheless, and given that accounting practices may differ, could the argument be made
that net worth, unlike financial condition, does not include pending legal claims? At this quantification
stage, exclusion of evidence of such pending claims could only be to the plaintiff's advantage.
163. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 39(2).
164. Id. at § 39(3).
165. Id. at § 39(5) provides: "The doctrines of remittitur and additur, based on the trial judge's
assessment of the totality of the surrounding circumstances, shall apply to punitive damage awards."
166. See generally infra text accompanying notes 219-21.
167. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 39(5).
168. Id. at § 42 provides: "A court may enter a remittitur order.
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general provisions use a "fair and reasonable compensation"' 6 9 standard-a
standard that obviously is inapplicable to review of a punitive award.
In addition, defendants may be able to reduce punitive damage judgments
by making a post-trial motion' 70 for credit for some previous payment or
payments. However, the new provision is not without its difficulties. For example,
excluded from this credit provision are many of the intentional torts.' 7' Further-
more, it is unclear whether, for the credit to apply, the "debtor" (the previous)
and "creditor" (the pending) causes of action both must fall within this list or
only the debtor or only the creditor.
The burden of proof on all issues is on the defendant. 72 The grounds for
denying motion for credit 73 are first, that the defendant's conduct in the creditor's
action was different from the conduct in question in the debtor's action.
74
Second, while the conduct that was the subject of the creditor's action was the
same, it had been unreasonably continued by the defendant.' 75 Third, the defen-
dant was claiming out-of-state credits and the Missouri (creditor) court found
them to be inapplicable on public policy grounds.
76
All three grounds involve difficult comparisons and judgment calls. Consider,
CarCo, a Missouri corporation, which manufactures a complete line of auto-
mobiles and trucks. CarCo settles a products claim brought in Anystate concerning
alleged quality control defects in the power steering system fitted to a pick-up.
That (debtor) action had been brought on both negligence and strict liability
theories and had involved both punitive and compensatory claims. Subsequently,
a jury in Missouri awards punitive damages against CarCo in a case brought on
169. Id. at § 42.
170. Id. at § 39.4 states:
Within the time for filing a motion for new trial, a defendant may file a post-trial motion
requesting the amount awarded by the jury as punitive damages be credited by the court
with amounts previously paid by the defendant for punitive damages arising out of the
same conduct on which the imposition of punitive damages is based. . . .Such a motion
shall be determined by the trial court within the time and according to procedures applicable
to motions for new trial.
171. Id. at § 39(5) states: "The credit allowable under this section shall not apply to causes of
action for libel, slander, assault, battery, false imprisonment, criminal conversation, malicious
prosecution or fraud." Quaere the situation with so-called business, or economic, torts or intentional
infliction of emotional harm.
172. Id. at § 39(4).
173. Id.
174. -[If] the trial court finds from the evidence that the defendant's conduct out of which the
prior punitive damages award arose was not the same conduct on which the imposition of punitive
damages is based in the pending action." Id.
175. "[If] the trial court finds the defendant unreasonably continued the conduct after acquiring
actual knowledge of the dangerous nature of such conduct." Id.
176. "[I]f the trial court finds that the laws regarding punitive damages in the state in which
the prior award of punitive damages was entered substantially and materially deviate from the law
of the state of Missouri and that the nature of such deviation provides good cause for disallowance
based on the public policy of Missouri." Id.
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a strict liability theory in which plaintiff had alleged the defective design of the
power steering system fitted to a passenger car. CarCo files a post-trial motion
requesting that its Anystate payment be credited against the Missouri award. The
fact-intensive issues that will arise will be as complex as any of those handled at
trial. How does CarCo prove that the settlement payment in Anystate included
an amount for punitive damages? Does "same conduct" involve normative as
well as factual propositions? Thus, could plaintiff in the Missouri action argue
that different conduct was at issue because the settlement in Anystate had involved
a negligence count? Factually, what is "same conduct?" Is it making motor
vehicles, or is making a truck different conduct from making a passenger car?
Is it sufficient that the conduct in both cases involved the same (or similar)
model power steering mechanism? Is it relevant that the Anystate conduct involved
a quality control defect allegation, whereas the Missouri allegation was of defective
design?
Presume that defendant CarCo meets its burden on the issue of same conduct.
Plaintiff will argue that the "defendant unreasonably continued the conduct after
acquiring actual knowledge of the dangerous nature of such conduct."'' 77 How
will the defendant be able to carry its burden on this issue in the face of the
jury determination that, "at the time defendant sold the (vehicle), defendant
knew of the [defective condition of the steering mechanism and danger]. . . and
[s]econd, defendant thereby showed complete indifference to or conscious disre-
gard for the safety of others. ..?,,17 Finally, what will constitute substantial
and material deviations in the laws regarding punitive damages between Anystate
and Missouri? Whatever the answers to these questions, this new provision will
have a dramatic effect on the settlement value of ma cases which incorporate
punitive counts. /
C. Tort Victims' Compensation Fund
Still more confusion will be caused by the newly created "Tort Victims'
Compensation Fund.' ' 79 The raison d'etre of this new fund is that it shall be
the recipient of "[flifty percent of any final judgment awarding punitive damages
after the deduction of attorneys' fees and expenses." Unfortunately, several
difficult problems arise. First, it is unclear at what stage a final judgment has
been rendered. While the wording of the provision suggests that this would occur
when judgment is entered by the trial judge, logic dictates that it cannot occur
177. Id.
178. MAI 10.04 [1983 New] Damages-Exemplary-Strict Liability-Either Product Defect or
Failure to Warn Submitted.
179. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 40 provides:
1. There is created the "Tort Victims' Compensation Fund.".
2. Fifty percent of any final judgment awarding punitive damages after the deduction of
attorneys' fees and expenses shall be deemed rendered in favor of the state of Missouri.
The circuit clerks shall notify the attorney general of any final judgment awarding punitive
damages rendered in their circuits ....
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prior to disposition of all appeals. Second, the statute only refers to judgments.
There is no mention of settlements. Thus, the provision may be circumvented by
settling punitive damage claims. 80 Third, it should be possible to design a
contingency fee agreement whereby attorneys' fees and expenses are satisfied first
from any punitive award.' 8' Any complaints that may be harbored by the Attorney
General with regard to such strategic behavior will be difficult to act upon
because the statute provides that, "[tihe State of Missouri shall have no interest
in or right to intervene at any stage of any judicial proceeding under this
section. 182
VII. JOINT LIABILITY AND RELATIVE FAULT 183
A. In General
Almost ten years ago the Missouri Supreme Court introduced a relative fault
approach to non-contractual indemnity and contribution between non-contractual
judgment and non-judgment tortfeasors. '4 Two inter-related issues arise for
consideration in a post-Whitehead & Kales environment. First, given that the
underlying premise of Whitehead & Kales (and, for that matter Gustafson v.
Benda'85 ) was to permit the jury to determine the relative fault of all the parties,
should that determination extend to, for example, settling or immune "defen-
dants?"
Second, should the jury's determination of the relative fault of defendants
affect the plaintiff-tortfeasor relationship or only the tortfeasor relationship inter
se. In other words, should the rules of joint and several liability be abrogated
or modified such that a tortfeasor is only responsible to the plaintiff for her
equitable share of the verdict? Missouri courts have been steadfast in replying in
the negative to both of these questions. 1
By way of example consider the employee injured at work by a defective
product, in part because of the negligence of her employer. Needless to say,
neither the worker's compensation rights of the employee nor any subrogation
rights enjoyed by the employer abrogate the rights of the employee to bring
180. Thus, a whole array of new settlement considerations will come into play.
181. Indeed, it may be argued that this conforms to the literal wording of the provision.
182. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 40.3.
183. See generally Comment, Where is the Principle of Fairness in Joint and Several Liability-
Missouri Stops Short of a Comparative Fault System? 50 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1985); UCFA, supra
note 95.
184. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Whitehead & Kales Co., 566 S.W.2d 466 (Mo. 1978) (en
banc).
185. 661 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
186. A related argument has been made to the effect that the adoption of comparative (as
opposed to relative) fault should lead to the abrogation of the joint and several liability rule. See
generally Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 204-06.
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an action against a non-employer product manufacturer.' 87 The product man-
ufacturer's first instinct will be to implead the employer.,"8 This may be resisted
by the employer on the basis of its statutory workers' compensation immunity.
As the Missouri Court of Appeals recently has stated, "[in order for a party
to maintain an action for contribution, actionable negligence must exist between
the plaintiff and the one from whom contribution is sought."1 9 Neither may
the defendant bring an action for contribution or indemnity against the third
party employer,' 90 unless the employer was in breach of an express contractual
duty owed to the manufacturer. 9'
It has been suggested that the principles adopted by the supreme court in
Whitehead & Kales mandate that the relative fault of all, and thus immune or
released defendants, should be determined by the jury. 92 Although this has
some validity, the supreme court stated in Whitehead & Kales that "nothing
that transpires between [concurrent tortfeasors] as to their relative responsibility
can reduce or take away from plaintiff any part of his judgment."' 93 Clearly,
limiting the non-employer's liability to its share as determined by the principles
of relative fault would be fundamentally inconsistent with the principles of
joint and several liability.'
94
The abandonment of these general principles has little support on the
supreme court as presently constituted. 95 Recent appellate decisions confirm
that the jury will not be permitted to determine the relative fault of non-party
defendants who are, for example, settling tortfeasors, 96 or who benefit from
sovereign immunity. 97 However, the Missouri legislature has targeted important
187. See Hoppe v. Midwest Conveyor Co., Inc., 485 F.2d 1196, 1203 (8th Cir. 1973). Further-
more, judicial attitudes toward the concept of foreseeable use make it very difficult for a manufacturer
to establish in such a case that the employer's negligence was the sole cause of the employees injury.
See, e.g., Germann v. F.L. Smithe Mach. Co., 395 N.W.2d 922 (Minn. 1986).
188. See Welkener v. Kirkwood Drug Store Co., 734 S.W.2d 233, 241 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987)
(contribution and indemnity principles apply to those in chain of distribution of a defective product).
189. Osburg v. Gammon, 704 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (citation omitted). Accord,
Sweet v. Herman Bros., Inc., 688 S.W.2d 31, 32 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
190. State ex rel. Maryland Heights Concrete Contractors, Inc. v. Ferriss, 588 S.W.2d 489, 490
(Mo. 1979) (en banc).
191. McDonnell Aircraft Corp. v. Hartman-Hanks-Walsh Painting Co., 323 S.W.2d 788, 796
(Mo. 1959). See Parks v. Union Carbide Corp., 602 S.W.2d 188, 189-90 (Mo. 1980) (en banc) (such
an intent to indemnify must be expressed by "clear and unequivocal terms"); See also Maryland
Heights, 588 S.W.2d at 490.
192. See, e.g., Maryland Heights, 588 S.W.2d at 492 (Donnell J., dissenting).
193. Whitehead & Kales, 566 S.W.2d at 474.
194. See also Coney, 454 N.E.2d at 204-06 (rejecting defendant's argument that adoption of
comparative fault should result in judicial abrogation of joint and several liability). Cf. Uniform
Product Liability Act § Ill[B](2), 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714, 62,735 (1979).
195. Cf. Parks, 602 S.W.2d at 197-201 (Welliver J. dissenting).
196. Schiles v. Schaefer, 710 S.W.2d 254 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986).
197. State ex rel. Missouri Highway and Transp. Comm'n. v. Appelquist, 698 S.W.2d 883 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1985). For the most recent developments with regard to settlements and relative fault, see
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aspects of the relative fault and joint liability rules for abrogation. Thus, as
part of the reform of malpractice law undertaken in 1985,198 the relative fault
of a settling defendant will be assessed by the jury, and a dollar amount
representing that percentage of fault will be deducted from the verdict. 199 In
contrast, under Missouri's general contribution statute, 200 the actual settlement
figure would have been deducted from the subsequent verdict against the non-
settling defendants. Furthermore, the same malpractice legislation, while pre-
serving several liability, subjected joint liability to what may be termed a
pyramiding rule. 20
1
B. Products Liability and General Torts Cases
Missouri's new tort reform, which applies to actions other than those
brought against health care providers, is far less radical. 20 2 In cases in which
the plaintiff has been adjudged entirely innocent, the traditional rules providing
for joint and several liability continue to apply. 20 3 However, in cases in which
some fault has been assessed to plaintiff, the defendant may in a narrowly
circumscribed set of circumstances apply for a reallocation of responsibility
for certain amounts awarded by the jury. 204 Specifically, this statutory reform
Hampton v. Safeway Sanitation Servs., Inc., 725 S.W.2d 605 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987) (interpreting
section 537.060, the court held that a non-settling tortfeasor found by the jury to be partially at
fault, is relieved from liability when the verdict is less than the settlement between the plaintiffs and
one of the settling tortfeasors).
198. See generally Terry, supra note 6, at 479-82.
199. "[T]he claim of the releasing person against other persons or entities is reduced by the
amount of the released persons' or entities' equitable share of the total obligation imposed by the
court pursuant to a full apportionment of fault under this section as though there had been no
release." Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.230.3 (1986).
200. Id. at § 537.060.
201. "[A]ny defendant against whom an award of damages is made shall be jointly liable only
with those defendants whose apportioned percentage of fault is equal to or less than such defendant."
Id. at § 538.230(2).
202. Cf. Washington's 1986 Tort Reform Act which, while stopping short of adopting a pure
several liability system, introduced considerable limitations on the traditional joint and several liability
approach. See generally Harris, Washington's 1986 Tort Reform Act: Partial Tort Settlements After
the Demise of Joint and Several Liability, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 67 (1986).
203. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 41.1 provides:
In all tort actions for damages, in which fault is not assessed to the plaintiff, the defendants
shall be jointly and severally liable for the amount of the judgment rendered against such
defendants.
204. Id. at § 41.2 provides that:
In all tort actions for damages in which fault is assessed to plaintiff the defendants shall be
jointly and severally liable for the amount of the judgment rendered against such defendants
except as follows:
(1) In all such actions in which the trier of fact assesses a percentage of fault to the
plaintiff, any party, including the plaintiff, may within thirty days of the date the verdict is
rendered move for reallocation of any uncollectible amounts;
(2) If such a motion is filed the court shall determine whether all or part of a party's
230
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is designed to lessen the burden on a joint tortfeasor where a judgment co-
defendant is found, for example, to be insolvent. °0 "It avoids the unfairness
both of the common law rule of joint-and-several liability, which would cast
the total risk of uncollectibility upon the solvent defendants, and of a rule
abolishing joint-and-several, which would cast the total risk of uncollectability
equitable share of the obligation is uncollectible from that party, and shall reallocate any
uncollectible amount among the other parties, including a claimant at fault, according to
their respective percentages of fault.
205. By way of example consider the following situation. A sues B, C and D. A's total damages





On proper motion to the court pursuant to H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 41,2(1), C prays for
reallocation on the basis of. D's insolvency. The court determines that D's equitable share is uncollectible
and, pursuant to section 41.2(2), reallocates the uncollectible amount by reference to the relative
responsibilities of the remaining parties as follows:
A: 20% ($20,000) + 2/9 of $10,000 ($2,222) .............................................. $22,222;
B: 30% ($30,000) + 3/9 of $10,000 ($3,333) .............................................. $33,333;
C: 40% ($40,000) + 4/9 of $10,000 ($4,444) .............................................. $44,444.
It must be remembered that section 41.3 provides that:
This section shall not be construed to expand or restrict the doctrine of joint and several
liability except for reallocation as provided in subsection 2.
Thus, following the reallocation, the usual rules of joint and several liability should continue to apply.
Therefore B and C will be jointly liable for $77,777.
Suppose, however, that it had been C and B who had become insolvent. D brings proper motion
for reallocation. The judge reallocates C's share among A and D.
A: 20% ($20,000) + 2/3 of $70,000 ($46,667) ............................................ $66,667;
D: 10% ($10,000) + 1/3 of $70,000 ($23,333) ............................................ $33,333
However, such reallocation would run counter to section 41.2(4) which provides that:
No amount shall be reallocated to any party whose assessed percentage of fault is less than
the plaintiff's so as to increase that party's liability by more than a factor of two;
In our example D's original assessed percentage of fault (10%) was less than the plaintiff's (20%)
and the proposed reallocation would increase D's liability by $23,000 which is more than by a factor
of two.
It is unclear whether, in this situation, D can resist any reallocation or only that portion of the
reallocation that increase his exposure by more than the stated factor. Le., in this case, is all reallocation
to D to be denied or only the final $13,333? Expediency would tend to suggest the former. If not,
what would the court do with that $13,333? Allocate it amongst the other parties? On what basis? In
the example given it would all be allocated to the remaining party, plaintiff A. If there was more than
one party remaining would a second stage of reallocation take place on the basis of their relative fault
not taking into account D's share?
Note also that section 41.2(3) states: "The party whose uncollectible amount is reallocated is
nonetheless subject to contribution and to any continuing liability to the claimant on the judgment."
For what? To whom? Presumably to the plaintiff and defendant(s) for the amounts reallocated to them.
There appears to be no time limit with regard to this continuing liability. Thus the judgment tortfeasor
and the plaintiff to whom an insolvent judgment defendant's share has been reallocated will become
unsecured creditors in the insolvent's bankruptcy.
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upon the claimant. ' 20 6 This reallocation procedure 20 7 apparently was patterned
after a provision contained in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. 20 8
The core of the reallocation provision is that a "party's equitable share
. . . is uncollectible. ' ' 20 9 It seems arguable that implicit in the concept of
uncollectibility is a legal right to collect. 210 If so, a share that would have been
adjudged against a nonjudgment tortfeasor (for example, a co-defendant who
went into Chapter 11 bankruptcy and against whom proceedings were stayed
by the bankruptcy court) may not be subject to the post-judgment reallocation
procedure.
21,
206. Id. at 43, Comment to section 2. Cf. Duncan, 665 S.W.2d at 429:
Imposing the risk of an insolvent defendant on the remaining defendants is justified as a
matter of public policy because the defendants' conduct or products endangered another
person, the plaintiff, while the plaintiff's conduct only endangered himself. Furthermore, the
plaintiff seeks recovery for physical injuries, but defendants' claims for contribution are
merely economic. Finally, a solvent manufacturer is better able to spread the loss than is the
plaintiff.
(citation omitted).
207. Specifically, the procedure is detailed in section 41.2 which provides:
(1) In all such actions in which the trier of fact assesses a percentage of fault to the
plaintiff, any party, including the plaintiff, may within thirty days of the date the verdict is
rendered move for reallocation of any uncollectible amounts
(5) If such a motion is filed, the parties may conduct discovery on the issue of collectability
prior to a hearing on such motion;
(6) Any order to reallocation pursuant to this section shall be entered within one hundred
twenty days after the date of filing such a motion for reallocation. If no such order is entered
within that time, such motion shall be deemed to be overruled;
(7) Proceedings on a motion for reallocation shall not operate to extend the time otherwise
provided for post-trial motion or appeal on other issues. Any appeal on an order of denial
of reallocation shall be taken within the time provided under applicable rules of civil procedure
and shall be consolidated with any other appeal on other issues in the case.
Particular note should be taken of the somewhat conservative time limits contained in sub-sections
(1) and (6). Specifically, compare the thirty day rule in sub-section (1) with the one year period suggested
in the Uniform Act.
208. UCFA, supra note 95, at § 2(d). Minnesota is alone in having adopted this provision. See
MIN. STAT. § 604.02(2) (1984). Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, para. 303 (1979), which places the burden
of the insolvent tortfeasor on the other defendants.
209. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 41.2(2).
210. See Hosley v. Pittsburg Coming Corp. 401 N.W.2d 136, 139 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
211. Id. at 139-40. In addition consider a somewhat difficult question loosely based on the facts
of Jones v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 726 S.W. 766 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987). Plaintiff sued the housing
authority and its landscaping contractor for the wrongful death of her son who had been struck on the
side of the head by a stick thrown from a lawnmower. Presume that the jury returned a judgment for
$250,000 and apportioned the fault at 20% ($50,000) to the plaintiff, 60% ($150,000) to the Authority
and 20%/o ($50,000) to the contractor. According to Jones the liability of the housing authority is subject
to the $100,000 per person limitation contained in the Missouri sovereign immunity statute. The question
posed is whether the "extra" $50,000 would be reallocated to the plaintiff and the contractor under
H.B. 700. The answer will depend upon the court's interpretation of "uncollectible." If the Minnesota
cases are followed the solution would be that the reallocation provision would not apply because that
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Unlike the medical malpractice legislation, House Bill 700 contains no
provision that "keeps alive" for the jury the question of the relative fault of
settling tortfeasors. 2 2 Therefore, the question will arise as to whether it would
be in a plaintiff's interest to enter into a partial settlement with a defendant
whom she suspects is facing financial difficulties. The paradigm situation
suggests not. 21 I However, more practical considerations may dictate otherwise
when there is a large number of defendants, or in other situations, where the
jury may be tempted to ignore an instruction to determine the relative fault
of the parties and, instead, merely arrive at some discounting percentage of
fault to be allocated to the plaintiff.
$50,000 never was collectible. A different result would be obtained if the court was to treat a case
involving a partially immune defendant the same as a case involving a totally immune defendant. Take
a one million dollar case where A sues B (a totally immune defendant) and C. If the case had gone to
trial the jury would have apportioned fault as follows:
A: 33.3307o;
B : 33.33% ................................ ................................................... $333,333;
C : 33.33% ................................................................................................... $333,333.
Of course our totally immune B would have been dismissed out. Theoretically at least, the jury should
have determined relative fault as follows:
A: 50%;
C : 50% ...................................................................................................... $500,000.
In other words, the risk of B's immunity would be spread equally between A and C. Now consider the
same situation in which C is only partially immune (i.e, for sums in excess of $100,000). If we take
the view that, once again, A and C should equally shoulder the risk of the immunity, the risk of
noncollection of $333,333 - 100,000 = 233,333 should be spread between them according to their
relative fault (in this case, equally). However, the natural reading of the statute suggests that the risk
of B's partial immunity should be shouldered by C alone.
212. See, e.g., UCFA, supra note 95, at § 6, 12 U.L.A. 38, 47 (Supp. 1987).
213. For example, consider a $100,000 jury verdict for plaintiff (A) assessing equitable shares of
the parties as follows:
A: 33.33%;
B: 33.33% .................................. $33,333;
C : 33.33% ................................................................................................... $33,333.
A should net $66,666. However, C is insolvent and A can only recover C's liability policy limits
of $20,000. Prior to H.B. 700, A would take $20,000 from C and, on the principle of joint and several
liability, $46,666 from B, leaving B an unsecured creditor in C's bankruptcy for $13,333.
Following H.B. 700, B will move for post-verdict reallocation of that part of the judgment that is
uncollectible from C ($13,333). This is achieved as follows:
A: 33.33% + 1/2 of C's $13,333;
B: 33.33% ($33,333) + 1/2 of C's $13,333 ..................................................... $39,999;
A nets $39,999 + $20,000 .............................................................................. $59,999.
Consider the situation in which A has some suspicion as to C's solvency. Theoretically, the following
should occur. A settles with C for policy limits ($20,000). A then proceeds to verdict against B. The
jury considers the relative fault of A and B to be the same whether there are two or three parties
before it. As a result, in this new two party scenario, the jury holds B 50% responsible, assessing A's
equitable share at the same 50%. The same $100,000 award is given. From that $100,000, the trial
judge will deduct the settlement (pursuant to Mo REv. STAT. section 537.060) leaving a balance of
$80,000. B pays $40,000 (50% of S80,000). A nets $60,000. Thus the result should be the same whether
or not A settled with C.
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C. Cases Involving Both Medical and Non-Medical Defendants
Missouri's medical malpractice reform legislation and House Bill 700's
general tort reforms apparently were designed to be mutually exclusive.
214
Unfortunately, neither statute considers the situation in which one defendant
is a health care provider 215 and the other is not, with potentially chaotic
results. 21 6
214. Mo. REv. STAT. § 538.230(3) (1986) provides for the (jury) determination of a settling
defendant's relative fault (and, hence, the nonsettling defendant's equitable share) and abrogates the
joint and several liability rule to the extent that nonsettling judgment tortfeasors are not jointly and
severally liable for that share of the judgment allocated to the settling defendant. Section 538.230(2)
institutes a pyramiding modification to the joint and several liability rule such that a defendant will
only be jointly liable for a co-defendant's equitable share which is equal to or less than her own.
Section 538.230 applies "[i]n any action against a health care provider." H.B. 700 section 44 states
that: "The provisions of section . . . 41, . . . of this act shall not apply to actions under section[s]
. . . 538.230, RSMo."
215. Defined in Mo. Rv. STAT. § 538.205(4) (1986).
216. It is arguable that the malpractice statute's pyramiding rule (section 538.230.2) simply does
not apply to the equitable shares of nonhealth care defendants. See Terry, supra, note 6, at 480. Take




D (product manufacturer): 10070;
E (component mufacturer): 4000. o
Under the malpractice act, B will not be jointly liable for C's share, but, probably, will be jointly
liable for D's and E's. C will be jointly liable for B's, D's and E's shares. Irrespective of the malpractice
act, D will be jointly liable for B's, C's and E's shares. Likewise, E will be liable for the shares of B,
C and D.
Suppose, however, C proves to be insolvent. Because (and only because) A is partially at fault, D
seeks to invoke H.B. 700 section 41.2 and move for reallocation of C's equitable share among A, B,
D and E. Consider the following possibilities:
(1) The court could deny D's motion on the basis that the underlying action involved a
health care provider and thus section 41.2 has no effect.
(2) The court could deny the motion on the basis that C is a health care provider and
thus the reallocation rules are not applicable.
(3) The court could deny the motion with regard to any reallocation of C's equitable
share to B (a health care provider), but grant it with regard to reallocation to A, D and
E. This would result in the following distribution:
A: 1007o + 1/6 of 30%;
B: 1000;
C: 00;
D: 10% + 1/6 of 300o;
E: 4007o + 4/6 of 30%.
The problem is that under the malpractice act's pyramiding rules, B (1007) would not have been jointly
liable for C's 300o. However, now would B be jointly liable for the reallocated liabilities of D and E,
including as they do part of C's liability?
In the event that the court chooses option # 2, an additional question is raised. Supposing D rather
than C was insolvent? Presumably reallocation of D's share would be permitted subject to a refusal to
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VIII. ADDITIONAL CHANGES
House Bill 700 contains other provisions ranging from a minor21 7 modification
of the collateral source rule, 218 to the resurrection 2 19 of remittitur 220 and the
reallocate to a health care provider as in #3.
Even more difficult questions arise with regard to the malpractice act's determination of the relative
fault of settling defendants.





Prior to trial C settles with A for $10,000. Clearly, H.B. 700 has no effect because (i) possibly, the
action is against a health care provider; (ii) the plaintiff was not at fault; (iii) the case does not involve
a motion for reallocation because that provision has no application to non-judgment tortfeasors such
as C. However, what is the impact of section 538.230.3? If B, D and E were all health care providers
the jury award would be restructured such that B, D and E would be severally liable only for their
equitable shares of $70,000 (incidentally, the pyramiding rule also would apply such that D would not
be jointly liable for the shares of B or E, and B would not be jointly liable for E's share). Suppose,
however, E is a product manufacturer.
(1) Should the court hold section 538.230.3 inapplicable on the basis that there is a nonhealth care
provider involved?
(2) Should the court limit its applicability to the health care defendants? This latter approach would
lead to the following situation:
B (doctor): seveially* liable for 2006 of $70,000;
C (settling nurse): liable for $20,000 settlement;
D (nurse): severally liable for 10% of $70,000;
E (manufacturer): severally liable for 40% of $100,000.
*The joint liability of B and D (but not E) would be subject to the pyramiding rule.
217. In fact the only practical change will be to permit evidence that plaintiff's special damages
have been paid by another. The source of this payment (the defendant) may not be identified. The
*Task Force's recommendation would have gone slightly further. It would have abrogated the collateral
source rule in all cases where the plaintiff had not paid for the collateral benefit. Final Report, supra
note 7.
218. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 38.
219. In 1985, the Missouri Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of remittitur. Firestone v.
Crown Center Redevelopment Corp., 693 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. 1985). At that time the court stated:
"What may have begun with a worthy purpose of bringing uniformity to verdicts and judgments for
unliquidated damages has been eroded by added considerations and irreconcilable case by case
evaluations. "
220. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 42. Presumably the trial judge will examine the appropriateness
of the amount awarded prior to any reduction for comparative negligence. See Lamborn v. Philips
Pacific Chem. Co., 89 Wash. 2d 701, 575 P.2d 215 (1978). For a recent example of typical remittitur
see Kavanaugh v. Nussbaum, 129 A.2d 559, 514 N.Y.S.2d 55 (1987).
The new statute is silent as to the question of appellate remittitur which was in disfavor prior
even to the Firestone decision. See generally Comment, Appellate Remittitur, 33 Mo. L. Rv. 637
(1968). While the resurrected procedure will apply to punitive damage awards, H.B. 700, supra note
15, at § 39(5), it does not apply to medical malpractice cases, H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 45. In
those cases, therefore, the damage limitations introduced by S.B. 663 (1986) will continue to apply.
Specifically, a noneconomic damages ceiling § 538.210(1) and the structured payment of future
damages § 538.220(2).
UMKC LA W REVIEW [Vol. 56, No. 2
introduction of additur. 221 Limited immunities have been introduced to protect
uncompensated officers of not-for-profit corporations2 22 and those involved in
the clean-up of toxic wastes. 223 In addition, settlements and their more rapid
processing have been encouraged by permitting prejudgment interest to run from
the date of an initial settlement offer.224
IX. CONCLUSION
Overall, the reforms introduced by House Bill 700 reflect the ambivalence
manifested by the Governor's Task Force over the question of whether there
really was a "crisis" 225 that required a statutory response. 226 There is no doubt
that the legislation has targeted the appropriate pro-defense sacred cows. Thus,
legislators truthfully may tell the lobbyists that they have enacted reforms of the
221. Id. See, e.g., Boyce v. Herzberg, 206 N.W.2d 548 (Minn. 1973).
222. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 43 provides:
Any officer or member of the governing body of any entity which operates under the
standards of section 501(c) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, who is not compensated
for his services on a salary or prorated equivalent basis, shall be immune from personal
liability for any civil damages arising from acts performed in his official capacity. The
immunity shall extend only to such actions for which the person would not otherwise be
liable, but for his affiliation with such an entity. This immunity shall not apply to intentional
conduct, wanton or willful conduct, or gross negligence. Nothing herein shall be construed
to create or abolish an immunity in favor of the entity itself.
It should be remembered that § 43 is subject to § 44. Thus, it is arguable that not-for-profit health
care providers do not fall within this section.
223. H.B. 700, supra note 15, at § 37 provides:
1. No person engaged in the business of waste clean-up of environmental hazards created
by others, including asbestos, shall be liable for any damages arising from the release or
discharge of a pollutant, resulting from such activity, in an amount greater than one million
dollars to any one person or three million dollars to all persons for a single occurrence.
The limitation of liability of this section shall not:
(1) Affect any right of indemnification which such person has, or may acquire by
contract, against any other person who is liable for creating an environmental hazard;
(2) Apply to persons who intentionally, wantonly, or willfully violate federal or state
regulations respecting the clean-up process.
2. For purposes of the section, the phrase "business of waste clean-up of environmental
hazard" shall mean an activity including the investigation, evaluation, planning, design,
engineering, removal, construction and ancillary services, which is carried out to abate or
clean-up a pollutant.
224. Mo. REv. STAT. § 408.040.2(2) (1986) provides that: "In tort actions, if a claimant has
made a demand for payment of a claim or an offer of settlement of a claim, to the party, parties
or their representatives and the amount of the judgment or order exceeds the demand for payment
or offer of settlement, prejudgment interest . .. shall be calculated from a date sixty days after the
demand or offer was made, or from the date the demand or offer was rejected without counter
offer, whichever is earlier. Any such demand or offer shall be made in writing and sent by certified
mail and shall be left open for sixty days unless rejected earlier .. "
225. For a critical reply to the prevalent crisis mongers, see Terry, The Malpractice Crisis in the
United States: A Dispatch From the Trenches, 2(5) PRop. NEGL. 145-50 (September/October 1986).
226. Final Report, supra note 7.
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law relating to joint and several liability, punitive damages, comparative fault
and state of the art. However, with the important exception of comparative fault
in products liability cases, the substantive effect of these reforms is minimal. 227
Furthermore, an even heavier, administrative cost has been exacted by this
piece of compromise legislation. Innumerable and difficult problems of interpre-
tation lie in ambush for the Missouri courts. 228 For, as with the malpractice
legislation of 1986, the Missouri legislature has demonstrated that its talents lie
elsewhere than in the drafting of clear and unambiguous tort reform legislation. 229
227. In fact even major tort reforms passed by state legislatures seem to have minimal effects.
According to a study commissioned by the Insurance Services Organization, the perceived impact on
insurance costs of the reforms enacted in 1986 is "marginal to non-existent." Prod. Safety & Liab.
Rep. (BNA) 395.
228. Additionally, it is inevitable that the question of constitutional challenge will be raised. For
example, an equal protection challenge could be posited on two grounds. In the case of the products
liability provisions, the challenge will be on the basis that products liability plaintiffs are being treated
differently from torts plaintiffs generally. In the case of the general tort reform, the challenge will
be based on the different treatment afforded plaintiffs whose cases fall within one of the new
provisions and those whose claims do not. Missouri takes a hands-off approach to equal protection
challenges such as this and will utilize a low level of scrutiny. It is expected that the legislation will
survive any such equal protection challenges. See generally Terry, supra note 6, at 483-88. More
difficult to predict would be the result of a challenge premised on Missouri's enshrined right to trial
by jury. See Mo. CoNsT. Art. I § 22(a) providing, ". . . the right of jury trial as heretofore enjoyed
shall remain inviolate." Most likely to come under fire on this basis are the new statute's provisions
dealing with remittitur and the more novel requirements that the trial judge should exercise tasks
traditionally left within the ambit of the jury; for example, additur (which lacks the conceptual basis
traditionally enjoyed by remittitur) the punitive damage credit and relative fault reallocation provisions.
With specific regard to remmittitur, consider Firestone, 693 S.W.2d at 110 (Mo. 1985), wherein the
supreme court abolished the doctrine of remittitur, holding it to be neither "a provision of statute
or rule in Missouri." In Firestone the court noted that "[A]pplications [of remittitur] have been
fraught with confusion and inconsistency. Its application in the appellate courts has been questioned
since its inception in Missouri as an invasion of a party's right to trial by jury .. " Id.
229. Although perhaps not the most egregious example contained in H.B. 700 but certainly of
great practical impact is the amendment to Mo. REv. STAT. § 509.050 which was designed to bring
all tort claims into line with the position enjoyed by medical malpractice claims by making imper-
missible the inclusion of any dollar amount in the ad damnum clause. See Sup. CT. R. 5506.
Unfortunately, the provision as drafted may have the effect of extending that to all claims. Cf. SuP.
CT. R. 55.05 (newly amended). This not only creates confusion but also provides a possible ground
of constitutional challenge under Missouri's multiple subjects rule. See e.g., Westin Crown Plaza v.
King, 664 S.W.2d 2 (Mo. 1984) (en banc).

